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Are  RTA  Agreements  with  Environmental  Provisions  Reducing  Emissions?  
Abstract  
This   paper   investigates   whether   RTAs   with   environmental   provisions   affect   relative   and   absolute  
pollution   levels.   In  order   to  do  so,   the  determinants  of   carbon  dioxide  emissions  convergence  are  
estimated   for   a   cross-­‐section   of   182   countries   over   the   period   1980   to   2008.   A   propensity   score  
matching  approach   is  combined  with  difference-­‐in-­‐differences   techniques  to  effectively   isolate  the  
effect  of  the  Regional  Trade  Agreement  (RTA)  variable.  The  usual  controls  for  scale,  composition  and  
technique   effects   are   added   to   the   estimated   model   and   the   endogeneity   of   income   and   trade  
variables  is  modelled  using  instruments.  The  main  results  indicate  that  the  CO2  emissions  of  the  pairs  
of  countries  that  belong  to  an  RTA  with  environmental  provisions  tend  to  converge  and  are  lower  in  
absolute  terms,  whereas  this  is  not  the  case  for  RTAs  without  environmental  provisions.  As  regards  
specific  agreements,  we   find   that  emissions  converge  more   rapidly   for  NAFTA   than   for  EU-­‐27  and  
Euro-­‐Med  countries.  We  find  consistent  evidence  that  only  RTAs  with  environmental  harmonization  
policies  affect  relative  and  absolute  pollution  levels.  
Keywords:  regional  trade  agreements,  environmental  provisions,  convergence,  CO2  emissions,  
matching,  difference-­‐in-­‐differences  
JEL  Classification:  F  18,  O13,  L60,  Q43  
I. Introduction  
One  of  the  most  controversial  debates  in  trade  policy  concerns  the  impact  of  trade  liberalization  on  
the   environment.   Trade   liberalization   can   be   implemented   unilaterally,   with   a   single   country  
reducing   its   trade   barriers   against   all   its   trading   partners,   or   regionally,  with  a   group  of   countries  
forming  a  Regional  Trade  Agreement  (RTA)  to  eliminate  trade  barriers  among  them.  The  latter  form  
of  trade  liberalization  has  been  predominant  since  the  early  1990s  and  there  is  increasing  interest  in  
assessing  the  effects  stemming  from  this  new  regionalism.  Not  only  direct  trade  and  income  effects  
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are  important,  but  also  the  impact  on  the  environment.  In  this  respect,  it  is  important  to  distinguish  
between  RTAs  with  environmental  provisions  (EPs)  and  RTAs  that  do  not  include  any  harmonization  
in  environmental  standards  as  part  of  the  agreements.  
  After   two  decades  of   research,   it   is  commonly  accepted  that   the  effects  of   trade   liberalization  on  
the  environment  are  complex.  They  can  be  classified  as  scale,  composition  and  technique  effects  and  
there   may   also   be   interaction   between   them   (Copeland   and   Taylor,   2003).   Most   of   the   recent  
literature  has  used  changes  in  trade  openness  as  a  proxy  for  trade  liberalization  (Frankel  and  Rose,  
2005)  and  many  studies  have  focused  on  the  effects  of  NAFTA  on  the  environment  (Grossman  and  
Krueger,   1991;   Stern,   2007).   Contrary   to   expectations,   early   findings   pointed   to   positive   effects.  
Surprisingly,  few  studies  have  been  devoted  to  other  regional   trade  agreements  and  to  the  best  of  
our  knowledge  no  studies  have  used  RTAs  as  a  trade  policy  variable   that  could   influence  pollution  
levels.  This   is  precisely  the  strategy  we  propose   in  this  paper  to   investigate  the  effects  of  trade  on  
the  environment,  that  is,  by  directly  including  an  RTA  variable  in  an  emissions  equation.  Moreover,  
we  hypothesize  that  the  effect  should  be  different  for  RTAs  with  and  without  EPs,  only  the  former  
agreements  being  likely  to  have  a  direct  effect  on  pollution   levels  or  on  convergence,  whereas  the  
latter  should  not  have  an  effect  once  we  control  for  changes  in  trade  openness.  One  problem  related  
to   estimating   RTA   effects   is   that   countries   possibly   select   into   trade   agreements,   which   could  
generate  endogeneity  bias.  In  a  different  context,  Badinger  (2008),  who  specified  an  RTA  variable  in  
a  productivity  equation,  addressed  the  endogeneity  issue  using  an  instrumental  variable  approach.  
The   main   shortcoming   of   this   approach   in   our   context   is   the   difficulty   in   finding   adequate  
instruments  that  are  exogenous  to  the  model.  Hence,  we  will  propose  an  alternative  strategy.  
In  this  paper  we  depart  from  the  previous  literature  in  two  important  aspects.  First,  we  specifically  
investigate   whether   RTAs   with   EPs   ŚĂǀĞ Ă ĚŝƌĞĐƚ ͞ŚĂƌŵŽŶŝǌĂƚŝŽŶ͟ ĞĨĨĞĐƚ ŽŶ ƉŽůůƵƚŝŽŶ͘We   will  
therefore   be   able   to   determine   whether   signing   an   RTA   with   EPs   leads   governments   to   impose  
guidelines   that   affect   relative   and   absolute   pollution   levels   and   whether   this   induces   pollution  
convergence.   Second,   the   identification   strategy   is   based   on   the   use   of   matched   samples   and  
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difference-­‐in-­‐differences  estimation  techniques   to  better   isolate  these  harmonization  convergence  
rules.   In   addition,  we   follow   the   recent   literature   to   correctly   account   for   the   complex   effects   of  
income   and   openness   on   pollution   levels.   In   particular,   the   underlying   control   variables,   namely  
openness  and   income   levels,  are   instrumented  away   (Frankel  and  Romer,  1999;  Frankel  and  Rose,  
2005),  since  both  might  be  influenced  by  RTA  formation.  Finally,  results  for  specific  agreements  are  
also  presented  and  compared.  
The   main   results   show   evidence   of   RTAs   with   environmental   provisions   statistically   explaining  
convergence  of  pollution  levels  across  pairs  of  countries.  Moreover,  the  agreements  that  specifically  
include  provisions  to  ensure  enforcement  (NAFTA)  are  converging  at  a  higher  rate  than  others  (EU),  
which   leave  compliance  measures  to  the   legal  system.  Conversely,  RTAs  without  EPs  do  not  affect  
relative  or  absolute  pollution   levels,   indicating  that  controlling  for  bilateral  trade   levels  and  overall  
openness,  the  trade  policy  variable  does  not  have  a  direct  effect  on  emissions  convergence  for  this  
type  of  agreements.  
The   paper   is   organized   as   follows.   Section   2   states   the  main   theoretical   prediction   and   Section   3  
reviews   the   main   empirical   literature.   Section   4   describes   the   empirical   strategy   and   the   data,  
variables  and  main  results  are  presented  in  Section  5.  Finally,  Section  6  concludes.  
  
II. Regional  Integration  and  Emission  Convergence:  Theoretical  Predictions    
1. Trade  and  the  Environment  
The   negotiations   for   the  North   American   Free   Trade   Agreement   (NAFTA)  were   followed   by   fears  
regarding  its  impact  on  the  environment.  Indeed,  the  literature  on  trade  and  environmental  quality  
began  to  emerge  in  this  period.  Grossman  and  Kruger  (1991)  was  the  first  paper  to  decompose  the  
total   impact  of  trade  on  the  environment   into  three  different  effects,  namely  scale,  technique  and  
composition  effects.  
The   scale   effect   is   assumed   to   have   a   negative   impact   on   the   environment.   According   to   general  
belief,   trade   liberalization   leads   to   an   expansion   in   economic   activity   and,   all   other   things   being  
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equal  (composition  and  techniques  of  production),  the  total  amount  of  pollution  will  then  increase  
(for   example,   economic   growth   due   to   trade   raises   the   demand   for   energy   and   boosts  
transportation,  which  is  one  of  the  main  emitting  sectors).  It  is  worth  noting  that  this  pass-­‐through  
between  trade  and  the  environment  assumes  a  positive  effect  of   trade   liberalization  on  economic  
growth4.  The  income  effects  of  trade  are  linked  to  the  literature  on  the  Environmental  Kuznets  Curve  
(EKC),  which  assumes  an  inverted  U-­‐shaped  relationship  between  per  capita  income  and  pollution:  
Pollution   increases   in   the   early   stages   of   development   until   it   reaches   a   turning   point   and   then  
declines  (Copland  and  Gulati,  2006).5  However,  it  is  nowadays  generally  accepted  that  an  EKC  for  CO2  
does  not  exist  for  most  economies  (Carson,  2010).  
The   second   pass-­‐through   between   trade   and   the   environment   is   the   so-­‐called   technique   effect.  
Holding   the   scale   of   the   economy   and   the   mix   of   goods   produced   constant,   a   reduction   in   the  
intensity  of  emissions  ʹ  measured   in   terms  of  emissions  by  unit  of  output   -­‐   results   in  a  decline   in  
pollution.  Three  main  arguments  are  behind  this  effect.  First,  increased  trade  promotes  the  transfer  
of  modern   (cleaner)   technologies   from  developed   to   developing   countries.   Second,   if   trade   raises  
income,  individuals  may  demand  higher  environmental  quality  (if  the  latter  is  a  normal  good).  Third,  
according   to   the   Porter-­‐hypothesis   (Porter   and   van   der   Linde,   1995),   increased   globalization   will  
increase   competition.   In   order   to   stay   competitive,   firms   have   to   invest   in   the   newest   and  most  
efficient   technologies.   Thus,   more   stringent   environmental   policy   can   increase   international  
competitiveness.  In  summary,  the  technique  effect  has  a  positive  impact  on  the  environment.  
Third,   comparative   advantage   is   also   an   important   factor   that   could   explain   the   relationship  
between  trade  and  the  environment.  The  economy  will  pollute  more  if  it  devotes  more  resources  to  
the   production   of   pollution-­‐intensive   goods,   holding   the   scale   of   the   economy   and   emission  
intensities   constant.   The   composition   effect   ʹalso   referred   to   as   the   trade-­‐composition   or   trade-­‐
                                                                                                                    
4  A   large  body  of   literature  provides  empirical   evidence  of   the  positive  effect  of  openness   (see   for   example  
Dollar   (1992),   Ben-­‐David   (1993),   Sachs   and   Warner   (1995),   Edwards   (1998),   Frankel   and   Romer   (1999)   or  
Rodriguez  and  Rodrik  (2003)  for  a  critical  review).  
5   The  Environmental   Kuznets   Curve   relates   to   the  work  by  Kuznets   (1955),  who   found  a   similar   inverted  U-­‐
shaped  relationship  between  income  inequality  and  GDP  per  capita  (Kuznets,  1955).  
6  
  
induced   composition   effectʹ   is   caused   by   changes   in   trade   policy.   Through   trade   liberalization,  
countries  specialize  in  the  sectors  where  they  enjoy  a  comparative  advantage.  Among  the  sources  of  
comparative  advantage,  we  find  classical  factor  endowment  differences  or  unit  cost  differences  and  
those  based  on  differences   in   institutions  or  regulations  between  countries.  On  the  one  hand,   the  
Factor   Endowment   Hypothesis   (FEH)   states   that   environmental   policy   has   no   significant   effect   on  
trade   patterns,   factor   endowments   determining   trade   instead.   This   implies   that   relatively   capital-­‐
abundant  countries  will  export  pollution-­‐intensive  goods,   since  most  pollution-­‐intensive  goods  are  
capital-­‐intensive.  On  the  other  hand,  the  Pollution  Haven  Hypothesis  (PHH)  states  that  differences  in  
environmental   regulations   are   the  main  motivation   for   trade   and   that   trade   liberalization   causes  
pollution-­‐intensive   industries  to  relocate  from  high   income  countries  with  stringent  environmental  
regulations  to  low  income  countries  with  lax  environmental  regulations  (Taylor,  2004).  Hence,  with  
trade   liberalization,   high   income   countries   will   specialize   in   the   production   of   clean   goods   and  
pollution  in  these  countries  will  decline,  while  low  income  countries  will  specialize  in  producing  dirty  
goods  and  their  level  of  pollution  will  increase.  
In  general,  we  expect  countries  to  differ  in  both  factor  endowments  and  environmental  policy.  High-­‐
income  countries  tend  to  be  capital-­‐abundant  and  also  have  stricter  environmental  regulations  than  
low-­‐income  countries.  On  the  one  hand,   the  North  could  become  a  dirty-­‐good   importer   (as   it  has  
stricter  environmental  policy)  and,  on  the  other  hand,  it  might  become  a  dirty-­‐good  exporter  (due  to  
being  capital-­‐abundant).  The  interaction  between  these  two  effects  determines  the  pattern  of  trade.  
If   pollution   haven   motives   are   more   important   than   factor   endowment   motives,   the   North   will  
import  dirty  goods  from  the  South.  On  the  contrary,  trade  could  cause  the  North  to  specialize  in  the  
production   and   exportation   of   pollution-­‐intensive   goods   when   factor   endowment   differences  
dominate   regulatory   differences,   despite   having   the   stricter   environmental   regulations   (Copeland  
and  Taylor,  2003).  
7  
  
In   summary,   according   to   previous   literature   we   could   expect   comparative   advantage   to   be  
determined  jointly  by  differences  in  regulatory  policy  and  factor  endowments.  If  the  PHH  dominates,  
following   a   liberalization   process   between   a   developing   and   a   developed   country,   per-­‐capita  
emissions  will  tend  to  converge.  If  FEH  motives  dominate,  per-­‐capita  emissions  should  diverge.    
One   issue   that   has   been  overlooked   by   the   theoretical   literature   is   that   trade   policy   negotiations  
have  been  increasingly  accompanied  by  environmental  policy  measures.  Those  policy  measures  are  
planned  in  most  cases  to  avoid  the  potential  trade  effects  that  could  emerge  as  a  consequence  of  
differences   in   regulations.   In   particular,   a   number   of   recently   signed   RTAs   include   EPs   that   can  
directly   affect   the   levels   of   emissions   in   the   countries   involved.   This   pass-­‐through   could   be  
considered   an   additional   explanation   of   the   trade-­‐environment   relationship.   In   what   follows,   we  
focus   on   the   link   between   regional   integration   and   emissions   and   the   differences   encountered  
between  specific  agreements  with  respect  to  environmental  provisions.  
2. Regional  Integration  and  the  Environment  
In   the   specific   case   of   regional   integration   agreements   (RTA),   the   scope   of   the   agreement   is  
particularly   important.  More  specifically,  when  countries  sign  an  RTA,  not  only  tariff  dismantling   is  
planned,  but  also  cooperation  in  other  areas,  namely  the  protection  of  the  environment  and  cross-­‐
border  investments  are  sometimes  included,  among  other  issues.  Focusing  on  environmental  issues  
addressed   in   trade   agreements,   the   proponents   of   RTAs   with   EPs   have   mainly   been   developed  
countries,  namely   the  United  States,  Canada,   the  EU  and  New  Zealand.  Developing  countries  have  
instead  tended  to  address  environmental  issues  in  separate  side  agreements6.  The  main  differences  
between  the  type  of  EPs  included  in  RTAs  refer  to  the  basis  for  their  enforcement.  On  the  one  hand,  
NAFTA   and   the   EU   mainly   opt   for   legally   binding   provisions,   whereas   New   Zealand   opted   for   a  
nonbinding  approach.  On  the  other  hand,  the  binding  dispute  resolution  found  in  US  RTAs  is  in  the  
form  of  compensation  and  also  suspension  of  concessions,  whereas  only  the  former,  compensation,  
                                                                                                                    
6  Anuradha  (2011).  
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is   typical   of   EU   agreements.   In   what   follows   we   will   describe   the   main   particularities   of   three  
agreements,   namely   NAFTA,   the   EU   and   Euro-­‐Med   in   relation   to   the   environmental   issues   they  
address.  
In   the   case  of  NAFTA,   in  order   to   address   public   concerns  about   its   environmental   impact,   a   side  
agreement   on   the   environment   was   signed.   The   North   American   Agreement   on   Environmental  
Cooperation  (NAAEC)  stipulates  ƚŚĂƚ͙͞ĞĂĐŚWĂƌƚǇƐŚĂůůĞŶƐƵƌĞƚŚĂƚŝƚƐůĂǁƐĂŶĚƌĞŐƵůĂƚŝŽŶƐƉƌŽǀŝĚĞ
for  high   levels  of  environmental  protection  and  shall  strive  to  continue  to   improve  those   laws  and  
regulationƐ͟7.   The   NAAEC   stands   out   for   the   commitment   of   the   three   governments   to   account  
internationally  for  the  enforcement  of  their  environmental  laws.  Moreover,  in  order  to  avoid  a  race  
to   the   bottom   in   environmental   regulation   between   the   three   countries,   the   North   American  
Commission  for  Environmental  Cooperation  (CEC)  was  created  in  1994.  The  CEC  pays  a  crucial  role  in  
promoting   regional   environmental   cooperation   and   provides   the   basis   for   promoting   mitigation  
policies   that   address   the   possible   negative   environmental   effects   of   market   integration   and  
proactive   policies   that   enhance   its   beneficial   effects8.   Despite   all   the   progress   made   in   terms   of  
institutional   framework,   the   three   NAFTA   countries   have   failed   to   develop   an   international  
consensus   on   how   to   integrate   environmental   considerations   into   their   respective   trade   policies.  
Trade  policy  decisions   in  the  2000s  are  still  more   influenced  by  economical  considerations  than  by  
environmental  concerns9.  Perhaps  another  reason  for  such  little  progress  is  that  race-­‐to-­‐the-­‐bottom  
and  pollution-­‐haven  scenarios  have  generally  not  materialized.  It  is  also  worth  noting  that  out  of  the  
three   NAFTA   members,   Mexico   has   probably   benefited   the   most   from   the   Agreement,   which  
facilitated  progress  in  pesticide  control  and  pollution  prevention  and  ŝŶǀĞƐƚĞĚŝŶDĞǆŝĐŽ͛ƐĞŶŚĂŶĐĞĚ
                                                                                                                    
7  North  American  Agreement  on  Environmental  Cooperation  between  the  government  of  Canada,  the  
government  of  the  United  Mexican  States  and  the  government  of  the  United  States  of  America,  part  2:  
Obligations,  article  3:  levels  of  protection.  http://www.sice.oas.org/trade/nafta/Env-­‐9141.asp#TWO.    
8  One  of  the  three  principal  bodies  of  the  CEC  is  the  Joint  Public  Advisory  Committee  (JPAC),    which  launched  in  
2005   a   strategic   plan   for   the   period   2006-­‐2010   based   on   three   working   principals,   namely   transparency,  
outreach  and  engagement  and  three  main  pillars  (information  for  decision  making,  capacity  building  and  trade  
and  the  environment).    




environmental   management   capacities.   However,   the   impact   of   these   initiatives   can   hardly   be  
assessed   since   the   effectiveness   of   these   efforts   has   not   been   tracked   and   no   baseline   was  
established  to  systematically  measure  capacity  development  effects.  
In  what   follows  we   focus   on   two   additional   selected   RTAs,   namely   the   European  Union   (EU)   and  
Euro-­‐Med  agreements,  and  describe  the  climate  policies   that  have  been   included   in  each.  Starting  
with   the   EU,   an   important   number   of   climate-­‐related   initiatives   have   been   taken   within   the  
framework   of   this   agreement   since   the   early   1990s.   Such   initiatives   include   the   first   Community  
strategy   to   reduce   CO2   emissions   and   improve   energy   efficiency   in   1991   (materialized   into   a  
Directive   to  promote  electricity   from  renewable  energy,  voluntary  commitments  by  car  makers   to  
reduce   CO2   emissions   by   25   percent   and   proposals   on   the   taxation   of   energy   products)   and   the  
European  Climate  Change  Programme   (ECCP),   launched  by   the  Commission   in  2000.  While  one  of  
the  most  important  initiatives  of  the  ECCP  I  (2000-­‐2004)  was  the  EU  Emissions  Trading  System,  the  
ECCP  II  explored  other  options  to  reduce  Greenhouse  Gas  Emissions  (GHG),  such  as  carbon  capture  
and  storage.   In  2007,  an   integrated  approach  to  climate  and  energy  policy  was   launched  with   the  
commitment  to  convert  the  EU  into  a  low  carbon  economy.  With  this  aim,  a  number  of  climate  and  
energy  targets  have  been  set  for  ϮϬϮϬ͘dŚĞƚŚƌĞĞŵĂŝŶƚĂƌŐĞƚƐ͕ŬŶŽǁŶĂƐƚŚĞ͞20-­‐20-­‐2Ϭ͟ƚĂƌŐĞƚƐ  are:  
a  reduction  in  EU  greenhouse  gas  emissions  of  at  least  20  percent  below  1990  levels;  a  20-­‐percent  
share  of  EU  energy  consumption  to  come  from  renewable  resources;  and  a  20-­‐percent  reduction  in  
primary  energy  use  compared  with  projected  levels,  to  be  achieved  by  improving  energy  efficiency.  
As  regards  EU-­‐Mediterranean  climate  policy,  three  initiatives  are  worthy  of  mention  in  the  context  
of  the  Euro-­‐Mediterranean  Partnership.  First,  the  DG  Environment  LIFE-­‐Third  Countries  programme,  
which  provided  technical  assistance  and  co-­‐financed  around  3,506  environmental  and  conservation  
projects   in   the   Mediterranean   region   during   the   period   1992   to   2006.   Second,   the   Short   and  
Medium-­‐Term   Priority   Environmental   Action   Programme   (SMAP),   which   constitutes   the   common  
basis  for  environmental  actions  related  to  policies  and  funding  at  regional  and  national  level  and  was  
financed  by   the  MEDA  programme   (2000-­‐2006).   Finally,   the  ͞,ŽƌŝǌŽŶϮϬϮϬ͟ initiative   launched  by  
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the   Commission   in   2005   and   aimed   at   reducing   pollution   by   2020.   This   initiative   targets  
Mediterranean  countries  covered  by  European  Neighbourhood  Policy  (Algeria,  Egypt,  Israel,  Jordan,  
Lebanon,   Libya,   Morocco,   Palestinian   Authority,   Syria   and   Tunisia),   EU   Member   States   and   the  
accession   countries,   which   must   also   apply   EU   environmental   legislation.   Existing   environmental  
instruments  will  be  used  to  fulfil  the  commitments  agreed  upon  under  the  Barcelona  Convention.  In  
particular,  this  common  initiative  will  finance  projects  to  reduce  pollution,  include  capacity-­‐building  
measures   such  as   the  development  of   legislation  and   institutions   to  protect   the  environment  and  
will   also   include  monitoring   and  managing   the   initiative.   It   is  worth   noting   that   according   to   the  
WTO,  only  two  of  these  countries  have  environmental  provisions   in  their   interim  agreements  with  
the  EU,  namely  Tunisia  and  Jordan.  However,  as  we  have  described  above,  since  2005   the  EU  has  
financed   a   number   of   projects   that   target   environmental   issues   in   most   of   the   Mediterranean  
countries.  
These  institutions  and  mechanisms,  created  in  the  case  of  NAFTA,  the  EU  and  Euro-­‐Med  agreements  
illustrate   the   possible   policy   responses   to   the   potential   effects   of   regional   integration   on   the  
environment.  In  particular,  there  could  be  two  effects  at  work  depending  on  the  type  of  agreement.  
First,   in   case  of   agreements   that  do  not   include  environmental  provisions,   country  members,   and  
especially  southern  countries,  can  adopt  lax  environmental  legislation  to  gain  competitiveness  once  
trade  barriers  are  eliminated,  or  to  attract  multinationals  and  favor  a  relocation  of  economic  activity  
ĨƌŽŵƚŚĞĚĞǀĞůŽƉĞĚƉĂƌƚŶĞƌ͘dŚŝƐƌĞůŽĐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ͞ĚŝƌƚǇ͟ĂĐƚŝǀŝƚŝĞƐůĞĂĚƐƚŽĐŽŶǀĞƌŐĞŶĐĞŝŶƚŚĞůĞǀĞůŽĨ
emissions.   Second,   regional   integration   that   includes   environmental   provisions   can   lead   to   the  
harmonization  of  rules  and  standards,  which  could  also  lead  to  convergence  in  emissions.  The  first  
effect  will  result  in  the  South  having  a  comparative  advantage  in  dirty  industries  with  respect  to  the  
North,  once  trade  barriers  are  dismantled.  However,  holding  constant  the  volume  of  trade  between  
countries   in   the   South   and   the   North,   the   direct   effect   on   emissions   convergence   should   not   be  
present.   Conversely,   RTAs   with   environmental   provisions   could   indeed   have   a   direct   effect   on  
emissions   convergence,   holding   constant   bilateral   trade,   openness   and   income   levels.   This   is  
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precisely  what   we   hypothesize   and   will   test   in   the   empirical   part   of   the   paper.   Table   A.1   in   the  
Appendix  lists  the  RTAs  in  force  by  type  and  distinguishes  between  agreements  with  environmental  
provisions  and  those  without.  We  define  RTAs  with  environmental  provisions  as  those  that  according  
to   the   Regional   Trade   Agreements   Information   System   (RTA-­‐IS)   of   the  World   Trade   Organization  
(WTO)  cover  the  ƚŽƉŝĐ͞ĞŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚ͘͟  
III. Trade,  Regional  Integration  and  Emissions:  a  Survey  
After  describing  the  theoretical  mechanisms  and  the  environmental  provisions  of  selected  RTAs,  this  
section   briefly   surveys   the   econometric   studies   dealing   with   the   link   between   trade,   regional  
integration  and  the  environment.  
Antweiler  et  al.  (2001),  a  widely  cited  study,  extends  the  work  of  Grossman  and  Krueger  (1991)  and  
develops  a  theoretical  model  based  on  the  decomposition  of  the  effect  of  trade  on  the  environment  
into  scale,  composition  and  technique  effects.  They  estimate  and  sum  these  effects  to  explore  the  
overall   impact   of   increased   trade   on   the   environment,   thereby   allowing   for   pollution   haven   and  
factor  endowment  motives.  Their  results  show  that  trade  intensity  per  se  is  not  significant.  However,  
when  interacted  with  country  characteristics,  the  estimated  effect  is  positive,  statistically  significant  
and  small.  When  they  add  up  the  estimates  of  scale,  technique  and  composition  effects,  they  find  
that   increased   trade   causes   a   decline   in   sulfur   dioxide   concentrations   concluding   that   freer   trade  
seems   to   be   good   for   the   environment.   Dean   (2002)   uses   a   simple   Heckscher-­‐Ohlin   model   of  
international  trade  with  endogenous  factor  supply  that  can  be  affected  by  trade  policy.  It  consists  of  
a  two-­‐equation  system  that  captures  the  effect  of  trade  liberalization  on  the  environment  through  
two  channels:  its  direct  effect  on  the  composition  of  output  (the  composition  effect)  and  its  indirect  
effect  via  income  growth  (the  technique  effect).  The  author  finds  that  a  fall  in  trade  restrictions  has  a  
direct  negative  effect  on  environmental  quality  via   the  composition  effect  and  an   indirect  positive  
effect  via  the  technique  effect,  the  latter  outweighing  the  former,  suggesting  that  trade  is  good  for  
the   environment.   Cole   and   Elliot   (2003)   rely   on  Antweiler   et   al.   (2001)   to  empirically   test   for   the  
effects  of  trade  on  emissions  per  capita,  emission   intensities  and  concentration   levels  for  different  
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air  and  water  pollutants.  They  find  that  results  depend  on  how  the  dependent  variable  is  measured  
(concentrations  versus  emissions)   and  also   vary  by  pollutant.   Frankel   and  Rose   (2005)   use  an  EKC  
framework   to   estimate   the   effects   of   trade   on   pollution   concentration   levels.   They   consider   per  
capita  income  and  its  square,  trade,  institutional  quality10  and  land  area  as  regressors.  They  take  into  
account  the  endogeneity  of  income  and  trade,  the  former  by  adding  lagged  values  of  income  and  the  
latter  by  using  instrumental  variables  derived  from  the  gravity  model  of  bilateral  trade.  Their  results  
show  that  controlling  for  endogeneity  does  not  affect  the  earlier  findings.  They  find  that  trade  has  a  
positive  impact  on  air  quality,  but  do  not  find  evidence  of  Ă͚ƌĂĐĞƚŽƚŚĞďŽƚƚŽŵ͛ĚƌŝǀĞŶďǇƚƌĂĚĞŽƌ
support  for  the  PHH.  One  shortcoming  of  this  paper  is  that  it  uses  a  cross-­‐section  approach  instead  
of  a  panel  data  approach,  as  most  recent  papers  do.  This  means  the  study  has  a  possible  weakness,  
since   they   do   not   control   for   unobserved   heterogeneity   that   is   time-­‐invariant.   More   recently,  
Managi  et  al.  (2009)  combine  the  specification  derived  from  Antweiler  et  al.   (2001)  and  the  use  of  
instrumental  variable  estimations  to  correct  for  the  endogeneity  of  income  and  trade.  They  find  that  
trade  has  a  beneficial  effect  on  the  environment  depending  on  the  pollutant  and  the  country.  OECD  
countries  benefit  from  trade,  whereas  trade  increases  emissions  in  the  case  of  Non-­‐OECD  countries.  
In  addition,  the  net  effect  of  an  increase  in  international  trade  flows  is  also  likely  to  be  determined  
by  the  subsequent  change   in   trade  patterns   (composition  effect)   in  which  connectivity  may  play  a  
crucial  role  (Bensassi  et  al.,  2011).    
In   this   paper   we   will   follow   the   strategy   employed   in   Managi   et   al.   (2009)   to   correct   for   the  
endogeneity  of   income  and  trade   in   the  emissions  equation,  but   in  addition  we   include  RTAs  with  
environmental  provisions  as  a  policy  variable  that  could  also  affect  emissions  directly.  
Stern   (2007)   is,   to   the   best   of   our   knowledge,   the   only   study   that   addresses   the   link   between  
regional   integration   and   emissions   convergence.   The   author   uses   data   from   1971   to   2003   to  
investigate  whether  or  not  entry  into  NAFTA  has  led  to  a  convergence  in  energy  use  and  emissions  of  
pollutants   in  Mexico,   the  United  States  and  Canada.  Results  show  strong  evidence  of  convergence  
                                                                                                                    
10  This  variable  is  proxied  by  an  indicator  for  democracy  (polity),  which  ranges  from  -­‐10  (strongly  autocratic)  to  
+10  (strongly  democratic)  and  is  taken  from  the  Polity  IV  project.  
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for   all   intensity   indicators   across   the   three   countries   towards   a   lower   level.   Although   intensity  
initially  rises  for  some  variables  in  Mexico,  it  eventually  begins  to  fall  after  NAFTA  comes  into  force.  
Per  capita  measures  for  two  pollutants  (sulfur  and  NOx)  also  show  convergence,  but  this  is  not  the  
case  for  energy  and  carbon.  The  latter  variables  drift  moderately  upwards.  The  state  of  technology  in  
energy  efficiency  and  sulfur  abatement   is   improving   in  all  countries,  although  there   is   little,   if  any,  
sign   of   convergence   and  NAFTA   has   no   effect   on   the   trend   of   technology   diffusion.   According   to  
ƚŚĞƐĞƌĞƐƵůƚƐ͕DĞǆŝĐŽ͛Ɛ  technology  is  improving  at  a  slower  rate  than  its  two  northern  neighbors.  
IV. Empirical  Strategy  
IV.1.  Model  Specification  
First,   along   the   same   lines   as   Stern   (2007),   we   aim   to   explore   whether   emissions   converge   for  
countries   involved   in   an  RTA.   In   particular,  we   distinguish   between  agreements  with   and  without  
EPs.  We   depart   from   Stern   (2007)   by   adopting  matching   and   difference-­‐in-­‐differences   estimation  
techniques   that   allow   us   to   control   for   the   endogeneity   of   the   RTA   variable   in   the   emissions  
equation  and  by  using  instrumental  variables  to  address  the  endogeneity  of  other  control  variables.  
Second,  we  will  also  examine  the  direct  effect  of  RTAs  on  absolute  pollution  levels  to  be  able  to  infer  
whether  convergence  is  towards  a  lower  or  higher  level  of  emissions.  
Our   starting   point   is   a   simplified   version   of   the   determinants   of   emissions.   Per-­‐capita   emissions  
depend  on  population,  land  area  per  capita,  per-­‐capita  GDP  and  an  openness  ratio.  These  variables  
are   assumed   to   control   for   scale,   technique   and   composition   effects11.   Given   that   all   the   well-­‐
established  theories   linking  environment  with   income  and  openness   indicate   that  double  causality  
could  bias  the  results,  we  will  control  for  the  endogeneity  of  income  and  openness.  
In  order   to   test   for   the   convergence  of   emissions,  we   estimate   a   log-­‐linear  emissions  equation   in  
relative   terms   in  which   the  dependent  variable   is   the   log  of  CO2  emissions  of  country   i   relative   to  
country  j  in  period  t  (Emit/Emjt).  The  estimated  model  is  given  by,  
                                                                                                                    
11  Our  model  considers  the  main  factors  affecting  emissions  in  line  with  Martínez-­‐Zarzoso  and  Maurotti  (2011)  
and  Frankel  and  Rose  (2005).  
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where   ݅   and   ݆refer   to   countries,   and   ݐ   to   the   year.   ௜ܻ௝    represents   the   pollution   emissions   gap  
between  a  pair  of  countries  i,  j.  Popit  (Popjt)  is  population  in  number  of  inhabitants  in  country  i  (j)  in  
year  t.  Landcapit  (Landcapjt)  is  land  area  in  square  kilometres  per  capita,  GDPcapit  (GDPcapjt)  is  GDP  
per  capita  at  constant  US  dollars  in  country  i  (j)  in  year  t.  Openit  (Openjt)  refers  to  the  openness  ratio  
measured  as   the   sum  of  exports   and   imports  divided  by  gross  domestic  product.   Since  GDPcap   is  
endogenously  determined,  we  use  a  set  of  instrumental  variables  for  income  taken  from  the  growth  
literature.  Openness  is  endogenous  too.  Consequently,  we  use  a  second  set  of  instrumental  variables  
for  this  variable  based  on  the  estimation  of  a  gravity  model  of  trade  using  a   large  dataset  on  pair-­‐
wise  trade͕ŝŶƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌǁĞƵƐĞĂĚŝŶŐĞƌ͛ƐƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞŵŽĚĞů;Badinger,  2008).  The  exponent  
of   the   fitted   values   across   bilateral   trading   partners   is   aggregated   to   obtain   a   prediction   of   total  
trade  for  a  given  country.    A  detailed  explanation  is  given  in  Section  IV.2  below.  
The  absolute  value  of  each  relative  term  is  considered  in  order  to  have  only  one  interpretation  of  an  
increase  in  the  value  of  the  variable,  since  any  increase  (decrease)  implies  divergence  (convergence)  
between   both   countries.   For   example,   an   increase   in   the   left-­‐hand-­‐side   variable   in   equation   (1)  
means   that   there   is   divergence   in   the   emissions   of   countries.   Two   bilateral   variables,   namely  
bilateral   trade   between   countries   i   and   j   and   the   variable   ܴܶܣ௜௝௧12,   are   added   to   the   basic  
specification:  ܤ݈݅ݐݎܽ݀݁௜௝௧     is  the  amount  of  trade  (exports  and  imports)  between  countries   i  and  j  in  
year   t         and  ܴܶܣ௜௝௧    is  a  dummy  variable   taking  a  value  of  1   if   countries  are   involved   in  a   regional  
trade   agreement   in   the   considered   year   and   zero   otherwise.   The   sign   of  ߚ   allows   to   test   for   the  
convergence  hypothesis.  A  positive  sign  means  that  the  emissions  gap  between  a  pair  of  countries  
                                                                                                                    
12  ܴܶܣ௜௝௧   will  be  denoted  as  ܴܶܣ  for  the  sake  of  simplicity.  
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that  have  an  RTA  increases,  whereas  a  negative  sign  suggests  convergence   in  the  emissions  gap  of  
countries  linked  by  an  RTA.    
In  order  to  assess  the  effect  of  RTAs  accurately,   it  has  to  be  isolated  from  any  other  variables  that  
might  impact  pollution-­‐level  convergence  as  a  result  of  RTAs.  For  instance,  relative  per-­‐capita  GDP,  
trade   openness   and   bilateral   trade   variables  might   be   influenced   by   RTAs.  We   also   address   RTA  
endogeneity  due  to  self-­‐selection  into  agreements.  
Next,   the   strategy  we   use   to   examine   the   direct   effect   of   RTAs   on   absolute   pollution   levels   is   to  
estimate  Equation  (1)  above  in  absolute  terms.  The  estimated  equation  is  given  by,  
  
  
                                 (2)  
where  Emit,  the  natural  logarithms  of  emissions  in  country  i  at  time  t,    is  the  dependent  variable.  The  
independent  variables  are  the  same  as   in  Equation   (1)   in  absolute  terms,  namely  population,   land  
per  capita,  GDP  per  capita  and  multilateral  openness  in  country  i  at  time  t,  and  RTAit  is  generated  as  
a  weighted  average  using  emissions  in  the  partner  countries  as  weights.  
IV.2.  Endogeneity  issues  
ƐĞŵƉŚĂƐŝǌĞĚďǇ&ƌĂŶŬĞůĂŶĚZŽƐĞ;ϮϬϬϱͿ͕ƚƌĂĚĞĨůŽǁƐ͕ƌĞŐŝŽŶĂůĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚƐ͕ƉŽůůƵƚĂŶƚƐ͛ĞŵŝƐƐŝŽŶƐ
and  environmental  regulations  may  affect  income.  Therefore,  we  instrument  income  with  a  number  
of   variables,   namely   lagged   income   (conditional   convergence   hypothesis),   population,   investment  
and  human  capital  formation.  The  latter  is  approximated  by  the  rate  of  school  enrolment  (at  primary  
and   secondary   level).   The   predicted   values   of   this   equation   are   used   to   calculate   GDPcapit   and  
GDPcapjt.  We   use   a   second   set   of   instrumental   variables   for   the   openness   ratio   and   the   bilateral  
trade  variable  based  on  the  estimation  of  a  gravity  model  of  trade  using  a  large  dataset  on  pair-­‐wise  
trade  flows.  The  standard  gravity  model  states  that  trade  between  countries  is  positively  determined  
by  their  size  (GDP,  population  and  land  area)  and  negatively  determined  by  geographical  and  cultural  
distance.   The   geographical   variables   are   exogenously   determined   and   hence   are   suitable  


















instruments  for  trade  ;&ƌĂŶŬĞůĂŶĚZŽŵĞƌ;ϭϵϵϵͿͿ͘tĞĨŽůůŽǁƚŚĞĂĚŝŶŐĞƌ͛Ɛ;ϮϬϬϴͿƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ
the  gravity  model.  Real  bilateral  openness  is  regressed  on  population,  land  area,  distance,  a  common  
border  dummy  and  a  landlocked  variable  (which  is  the  sum  of  a  landlocked  dummy  of  countries  i  and  
j).  Two  other  variables  are  included  in  order  to  be  consistent  with  the  theoretical  model:  a  measure  
of   similarity  of   country   size   (หሺܣݎ݁ܽ௜ሻ െ ൫ܣݎ݁ ௝ܽ൯ห)  and   remoteness   from  the   rest  of   the  world  
(Remote).13  Finally,  the  exponent  of  the  fitted  values  across  bilateral  trading  partners  is  aggregated  
to  obtain  a  prediction  of  total  trade  for  a  given  country.    
The   endogeneity   of   the   RTA   variable   is   addressed   using   matching   techniques.   These   techniques  
provide  a  simple  way  to  deal  with  the  selection  induced  by  RTAs.  Baier  and  Bergstrand  (2004)  give  
evidence   that   country   pairs   involved   in   RTAs   tend   to   share   common   economic   and   geographic  
characteristics.  Few  studies  use  matching  techniques  to  deal  with  the  endogeneity  of  RTAs.  Egger  et  
al.  (2008)  used  a  difference-­‐in-­‐differences  panel  matching  estimator  to  examine  primarily  the  effect  
of  RTA  formation  on  changes  in  shares  of  intra-­‐industry  trade.  Baier  and  Bergstrand  (2009)  provide  
the   first   cross-­‐section   estimates   of   long-­‐run   treatment   effects   of   free   trade   agreements   (FTA)   on  
ŵĞŵďĞƌƐ͛ ďŝůĂƚĞƌĂů ŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů ƚƌĂĚĞ ĨůŽǁƐ ƵƐŝŶŐ ŶŽŶƉĂƌĂŵĞƚƌŝĐ ŵĂtching   econometrics.   Their  
findings  show  that  matching  estimators  provide  plausible  estimates  of  the  average  treatment  effects  
of   an   RTA  on   the   trade   of  members   that   actually   form   one.  We   follow   a   similar  methodology   to  
match  pairs  of  countries  that  have  an  RTA  with  similar  pairs  of  countries  that  are  not  linked  by  any  
RTA.  
After  obtaining  the  matched  samples  for  each  year,  we  use  a  difference-­‐in-­‐differences  estimator  to  
evaluate  the  effect  of  the  treated  RTA  variable  on  emissions  convergence.  
                                                                                                                    
13  ܴ݁݉݋ݐ݁௜௝ ൌ ͲǤͷܦ௜௝஼஼൛ൣ൫σ ܦ݅ݏݐ௜௞ ሺܰ െ ͳሻΤே௞ୀଵǡ௞ஷ௝ ൯൧ ൅ ൣ݈݊൫σ ܦ݅ݏݐ௞௝ ሺܰ െ ͳሻΤே௞ୀଵǡ௞ஷ௜ ൯൧ൟ.  
  Where  ܦ௜௝஼஼   is  a  common  continent  dummy.  This  variable  will  then  be  equal  to  zero  if  countries  are  on  the  




The   effect   of   an   RTA   on   the   outcome14   ( ௜ܻ௝    which   is   the   pollution   emissions   gap)   of   a   pair   of  
countries   is   defined   as   the   difference   between   the   pollution   emissions   gap  of   a   pair   of   countries  
after  enforcing  an  RTA  and  the  outcome  that  these  countries  would  have  achieved  without  an  RTA.  
Put  differently,  the  impact  of  an  RTA   ŝƐŵĞĂƐƵƌĞĚďǇƚŚĞĐŚĂŶŐĞŝŶƚŚĞƉĂŝƌŽĨĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐ͛ŽƵƚĐŽŵĞ,  
which  is  attributable  to  the  RTA  only.  
The   difference-­‐in-­‐differences   (hereafter   DID)   approach   is   well   suited   to   dealing   with   this   issue  
(Meyer,  1994;  Heckman  et  al.,  1997).  Considering  the  RTA  process  as  a  natural  experiment,  the  DID  
method   evaluates   the   average   effect   of   the   treatment   (here   the   RTA)   on   treated   units   (pairs   of  
countries  linked  by  an  RTA  and  denoted  by  ܴܶܣ).  The  idea  is  that  comparing  the  outcome  of  a  pair  
of   countries  before  and  after  an  RTA   is  not   satisfactory  because  we  do  not  have  a  counterfactual  
(outcome  variable  for  the  pair  of  countries  if  they  had  not  entered  the  RTA).  In  order  to  control  for  
this   skew,   the   DID   method   compares   the   difference   in   outcome   before   and   after   the   RTA   for  
participating  countries  to  that  for  a  control  group.  The  latter  comprises  pairs  of  countries  that  have  
never  been  part  of  an  RTA.  These  countries  are  referred  to  hereafter  as  ܴܰܶܣ.    
Formally,  let   ௜ܻ௝௧
ଵ   be  the  outcome  in  period  ݐfor  a  pair  of  countries  ݅ǡ ݆  which  have  been  a  member  of  
an  RTA.  We  denote   ௜ܻ௝௧
଴   the  outcome  for  the  same  country  pair  assuming  it  was  not  linked  by  an  RTA.  
The  effect  of  the  RTA  for  this  pair  ݅ǡ ݆  is  then  measured  by   ௜ܻ௝௧ଵ െ ௜ܻ௝௧଴ .  
The  average  impact  of  the  RTA  is  described  by  ܧሺ ௜ܻ௝௧଴ ȁܶ ൌ ͳሻ.  Unfortunately,  we  cannot  observe  the  
outcome  for  the  same  pair  of  countries  both  as  a  participant  and  as  a  nonparticipant   in  an  RTA.  In  
other   words,   we   cannot   ascertain   the   outcome   of   the   event   of   nonparticipation   for   a   pair   of  
countries   that   signed   a   trade   agreement   or   conversely.   In   order   to   overcome   this   difficulty,   we  
compare  the  evolution  of  the  groups  RTA  and  NRTA  over  time,  assuming  that  they  would  have  been  
identical  in  the  absence  of  an  RTA:  
  
ܧሺ ௜ܻ௝௧଴ ȁܴܶܣ ൌ ͳǡ ݐ ൌ ͳሻ െ ܧሺ ௜ܻ௝௧଴ ȁܴܶܣ ൌ ͳǡ ݐ ൌ Ͳሻ  
                                                                                                                    
14  We  follow  Bertrand  and  Zitouna  (2008)  in  this  section  and  adapt  their  empirical  strategy  to  RTAs.  
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ൌ ܧሺ ௜ܻ௝௧଴ ȁܴܶܣ ൌ Ͳǡ ݐ ൌ ͳሻ െ ܧሺ ௜ܻ௝௧଴ ȁܴܶܣ ൌ Ͳǡ ݐ ൌ Ͳሻሺ͵ሻ  
  
The  terms  ݐ ൌ Ͳ  and  ݐ ൌ ͳ  refer  respectively  to  the  period  before  and  after  the  RTA.  Hence,  the  
missing  counterfactual  value  could  be  replaced  by  the  state  of  country  pairs  before  the  agreement,  
adjusted  to  take  into  account  the  growth  in  aggregate  outcome:  
  
ܧሺ ௜ܻ௝௧଴ ȁܴܶܣ ൌ ͳǡ ݐ ൌ ͳሻ ൌ ܧሺ ௜ܻ௝௧଴ ȁܴܶܣ ൌ ͳǡ ݐ ൌ Ͳሻ ൅ ݉௧ሺͶሻ  
  
Where   ݉௧ ൌ ܧሺ ௜ܻ௝௧଴ ȁܴܶܣ ൌ ͳǡ ݐ ൌ ͳሻ െ ܧሺ ௜ܻ௝௧଴ ȁܴܶܣ ൌ Ͳǡ ݐ ൌ Ͳሻ   denotes   the   DID   estimator   that  
assesses   the   impact   of   an   RTA  on  participating   countries.  We  obtain   it   by   regressing   data   pooled  
across  the  treatment  (country  pairs  with  RTA)  and  the  control  group  (country  pair  without  RTA).  The  
estimating  equation  is  given  by,  
  
௜ܻ௝௧ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚଵܴܶܣ௜௝ ൅ ߚଶܣ݂ݐ݁ݎ௧ ൅ ߚଷ൫ܧ݂݂݁ܿݐ̴ܴܶܣ௜௝௧൯ ൅ ߮ ௜ܺ௝௧ ൅ ߜ௧ ൅ ߳௜௝௧ሺͷሻ  
  
ܴܶܣ  is  a  dummy  variable  taking  a  value  of  1  for  treated  country  pairs  and  0  otherwise.  It  controls  for  
differences  in  constant  outcome   ௜ܻ௝௧   between  treated  pairs  of  countries  and  the  control  group.  We  
define  the  dummy  variable  ܣ݂ݐ݁ݎas  taking  a  value  of  1   in  the  post-­‐RTA  years  and  0  otherwise  for  
both   RTA   and   non-­‐RTA   countries.   This   dummy   variable   controls   for   time   effects   on   outcome ௜ܻ௝௧.  
Finally,  the  term  ܧ݂݂݁ܿݐ̴ܴܶܣ௜௝௧    is  an  interaction  term  between  ܴܶܣ௜௝  and  ܣ݂ݐ݁ݎ௧.   Its  coefficient,  
ߚଷ,   represents   the   DID   estimator   of   the   effect   of   an   RTA   on   the   treated   group.   A   vector   of   the  
characteristic  ratio  of  a  country͛s  pair  is  included  to  control  for  differences  in  observable  attributes  
between   the   treated   and   control   group.   The   vector   ௜ܺ௝௧    represents   the   ratio   of   some  observable  
features  of  a  pair  of  countries  ݅ǡ ݆at  time  ݐ.  These  observables  are  population,  land  area  per  capita,  
GDP  per  capita,  openness  ratios  and  bilateral  trade  as  presented  in  equation  (1).  ߜ௧   denotes  time-­‐
specific  dummies  that  control  for  factors  common  to  all  countries.  ߳௜௧  is  an  idiosyncratic  error  term  
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that  is  assumed  to  be  independent  and  identically  distributed.  We  also  estimate  a  panel  data  version  
of  model  (5)  for  the  emission  levels  given  by,  
  
ሺܧ݉௜௧ሻ ൌ ߜ௜௝ ൅ ߣଵܴܶܣ௜௧ ൅ ߛ ௜ܺ௧ ൅ ߠ௧൅߱௜௧ሺ͸ሻ  
  
Next,  we  explain  how  the  choice  of  the  comparison  group  is  made.  Intuitively,  the  DID  method  does  
not  provide  valid  estimations  when  the  comparison  group  differs  greatly   from  the  treated  pairs  of  
countries  over  the  pre-­‐RTA  period.   In  order  to  solve  this  problem,  we  combine  the  DID  estimation  
with  the  matching  method  (Blundell  and  Costa  Dias,  2000)15.  Propensity  score  matching  techniques  
identify  a  control  group  without  marked  differences  in  characteristics  compared  to  treated  pairs  of  
countries.  Failure  to  account  for  the  selection  problem  would  bias  the  estimated  impact  of  an  RTA.  It  
may  lead  to  correlation  between  the  RTA  variable  and  the  error  term  in  the  outcome  equation.  This  
would  be   the   case  when   the  agreement  decision   is  not   a   random  process,   but  due   to  observable  
characteristics  associated  to  a  given  trading  pair  of  countries,  such  as  distance,  which  also  influences  
the  post-­‐liberalization  outcome.  The  propensity  score  method  therefore  controls  for  selection  on  the  
basis   of   observed   characteristics.   Furthermore,  matching   pairs   of   countries   directly   could   require  
comparing   the   groups   RTA   and   NRTA   across   a   large   number   of   observable   pre-­‐liberalization  
characteristics.  The  propensity  score  method  reduces  the  dimensionality   issue  by  capturing  all   the  
information  from  these  characteristics  on  a  single  basis  (Rosenbaum  and  Rubin,  1983).  In  particular,  
it  measures  the  probability  of  signing  the  agreement  according  to  a  vector  of  pairwise  variables.  The  
estimation  of  this  probability  value  is  as  follows:  
We  use  propensity  score  matching  (PSM)  to  construct  a  statistical  comparison  group  that  is  based  on  
a   model   of   the   probability   of   participating   in   the   treatment,   using   observed   characteristics.  
Participants   are   then   matched   on   the   basis   of   this   probability,   or   propensity   score,   to   non  
participants.  We  estimate  a  probit  model  given  by,  
                                                                                                                    




ܲ൫ܴܶܣ௜௝ ൌ ͳ൯ ൌ ܨሺ൫ܴܩܦ ௜ܲ௝൯ ǡ ൫ܦ݅ݏ௜௝൯ ǡ ܥ݋݊ݐ݅݃ݑ݅ݐݕ௜௝ǡ ܥ݋݉݉݋݊݈ܽ݊݃ݑܽ݃݁௜௝ሻሺ͹ሻ  
  
where  RGDPij  denotes  the  sum  of  the  real  GDP  of  countries  i  and  j  .  
Disij  denotes  the  great  circle  distance  between  countries  i  and  j.    
Contiguityij  takes  a  value  of  one  for  countries  that  share  a  border  and  zero  otherwise.  
Common  languageij  takes  a  value  of  one  for  countries  that  have  the  same  official  language.  
Once   the   propensity   scores   are   estimated,   observations   from   the   treated   group   and   the   control  
group   are  matched.   Each   treated   pair   of   countries   is   associated   with   a   pair   of   control   countries  
endowed  with  a  similar  propensity  score16.  We  apply  this  econometric  methodology  to  match  pairs  
of  countries  linked  and  not  linked  by  an  RTA  (with  and  without  EPs)  during  the  period  1980-­‐2008.  
The  validity  of  PSM  depends  on  two  conditions:  
(a) Conditional  independence  (namely,  that  unobserved  factors  do  not  affect  participation).  
(b) Sizeable   common   support   or   overlap   in   propensity   scores   across   the   participant   and  
nonparticipant  sample.  
The  assumption  of   common   support  or  overlap  condition   for  matching  on   the  propensity   score   is  
that   the   estimated   score   is   smaller   than   unity   throughout.   This   condition   ensures   that   treatment  
observations  ŚĂǀĞĐŽŵƉĂƌŝƐŽŶŽďƐĞƌǀĂƚŝŽŶƐ͞ŶĞĂƌďǇ͟ŝŶƚŚĞƉƌŽƉĞŶƐŝƚǇƐĐŽƌĞĚŝƐƚƌŝďƵƚŝŽŶ;,ĞĐŬŵĂŶ͕
Lalonde,   and   Smith,   1999).   The   probability  model   provides   us  with   an  estimate   of   the   propensity  
score   ݌ሺܼሻ.   In   our   case,   the   latter   is   to   be   interpreted   as   the   likelihood   of   entering   an   RTA,  
conditional  on  the  observables.  Next,  we  have  to  ensure  that  the  treated  units  (new  RTA  members)  
and  the  control  units  (the  comparable  subgroup  of  nonmembers)  are  similar  with  respect  to  every  
observable  ܼ.  Thus,  balancing  tests  will  be  conducted  to  verify  whether  the  average  propensity  score  
and  mean  ܼare  the  same17.  
                                                                                                                    
16  tĞƵƐĞƚŚĞ͞ĐĂůůŝƉĞƌ͟ŵĂƚĐŚŝŶŐŵĞƚŚŽĚƚŽƐĞůĞĐƚƚŚĞĐŽŶƚƌŽůƉĂŝƌƐŽĨĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐ͘  
17A  balancing  score  test  and  a  T-­‐test  were  conducted  to  check  the  differences  within  bands  of  the  propensity  
score  between  treated  and  untreated  country  pairs.  
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We   base   our   choice   of   explanatory   variables   in   the   probability   model   on   Baier   and   Bergstrand  
(2004).   These   authors   show   that   gravity   variables,   namely   GDP   and   distance,   are   the   main  
determinants  of  the  formation  of  RTAs:  
(i) Distance   is   used   as   a   proxy   for   transport   costs:   two   countries   that   are   geographically  
close  will  have  lower  transport  costs.  The  lower  the  transport  costs  between  countries,  
the   more   each   country   can   consume   the   other   country͛Ɛ   varieties,   enhancing   trade  
creation  regionally  and  the  formation  of  RTAs.  
(ii) Incomes  are  used  as  a  proxy  of  the  economic  size  of  the  participating  countries.    
Other   Variables   that   are   associated   to   a   higher   probability   of   forming   RTAs   are   contiguity   and  
common  language,  as  proxies  for  trade  facilitation.  
V.   Data,  Stylized  Facts  and  Main  Results  
1. Data  and  Stylized  Facts  
The  RTA  data  are  taken  from  De  Sousa  (2012)  and  the  WTO  website18.  Distance,  common  language,  
contiguity   and   landlocked   dummies   come   from   CEPII19.   Bilateral   trade   flows   are   from   the   UN-­‐
COMTRADE   database   and   income,   investment,   land   area,   population,   school   enrolment   and  
emissions  data  are  from  the  World  Development  Indicators  (World  Bank,  2009).  The  sample  covers  
182  countries  listed  in  Table  A.2  and  the  period  dating  from  1980  to  2008.    
The   main   variables   used   in   the   emissions   equation   are   per   capita   real   gross   domestic   product  
(GDPcap);   carbon   dioxide   emissions   (Em)   as   a   proxy   for   the   level   of   pollution   and   environmental  
degradation;  the  openness  ratio  (Open),  which  is  calculated  as  exports  plus  imports  over  GDP;  total  
population  (Pop),  land  area  per  capita  in  square  kilometers  (Landcap),  bilateral  trade  (Biltrade)  and  
the  RTA  variable  that  takes  a  value  of  one  if  a  pair  of  countries  participate  in  the  same  RTA  (with  or  
without   EP)   and   zero   otherwise.   The   date   the   RTA   enters   into   force   is   taken   into   account  when  
                                                                                                                    
18  WTO  web  site  (http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/region_e.htm).    Programs  for  constructing  




building   this   variable.  All   variables,   apart   from  RTA,  are   transformed  by   taking  natural   logarithms,  
such  that  the  associated  coefficients  in  the  estimated  model  can  be  interpreted  as  elasticities.  Table  
A.3  in  the  Appendix  shows  the  summary  statistics  for  the  described  variables.  
As  shown  by  Baier  and  Bergstrand  (2009),  closer  countries  with  a  similar   level  of  wealth  are  more  
likely  to   join  a   free  trade  agreement.  Table   (1)   reveals   that  the  means  of   (ln)  distance,  sum  of  (ln)  
gross  domestic  products  and  language  and  adjacency  differ  between  countries  linked  by  an  RTA  and  
pairs  of  countries  without  an  RTA.  Countries  linked  by  RTAs  tend  to  be  closer  and  richer.  Moreover,  
they  are  more  likely  to  have  common  borders  and  share  the  same  language  than  the  rest20.  
  
Table  1.  Summary  of  covariate  means  
  
Figures   (1)   and   (2)   show   some   differences   in   the   bilateral   distances   between   pairs   of   countries  
involved  and  not   involved   in  RTAs.  Figure   (1)  shows  that  pairs  of  countries  with  an  RTA  are  closer  
together  than  those  without  an  RTA.  The  kernel  densities  function  of  (ln)  bilateral  distances  for  non-­‐
RTA  pairs  of  countries  is  more  centered  to  the  right  in  relation  to  the  kernel  density  function  of  (ln)  
bilateral  distances  for  RTA  pairs  of  countries.  
  
Figure  1.  Kernel  density  of  the  log  of  bilateral  distance  for  pair-­‐wise  countries  with  and  without  an  
RTA  
Figure  (2)  shows  that  country  pairs  with  an  RTA  tend  to  be  larger  economically.  The  Kernel  density  
function  for  countries  with  an  RTA  is  centered  to  the  right  in  comparison  to  pairs  without  one.  
Figure  2.  Kernel  density  of  the  sum  of  the  log  of  GDPs  pair-­‐wise  countries  with  and  without  an  RTA  
  
2. Main  Results  




The  matching  was  implemented  for  each  single  year.  Country  pairs  for  each  year  in  which  there  was  
at  least  one  agreement  (year  by  year)  are  matched  with  country  pairs  without  an  agreement  using  
propensity  matching  scores  and  then  a  dataset  was  created  with  the  matched  data21.    
Based   on   the   pooled   cross-­‐section   data,   Table   A.4   in   the   Appendix   displays   the   efficiency   of   the  
matching   procedure   for   RTAs.   The   balancing   property   is   verified22   and   the   reduction   in   bias23   is  
drastic  when  the  bias  is  initially  high.  Thus,  this  method  provides  a  valid  group  of  countries  to  which  
ǁĞǁŝůůĐŽŵƉĂƌĞĐŚĂŶŐĞƐŝŶƚĂƌŐĞƚĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐ͛ƉĞƌĨŽƌŵĂŶĐĞ͘  
In  order  to   illustrate  the  estimations  used  for  the  matching,  the  first  column  of  Table  2  shows  the  
results  from  pooled  cross-­‐section  estimations  for  the  determinants  of  the  decision  to  enter  into  an  
RTA   for   all   country   pairs   (equation   4).   It   supports   the   stylized   facts   and   shows   that   economic  
characteristics  and  geographic  conditions  are  the  main  determinants  of  the  decision  to  join  an  RTA  
for   the   whole   sample.   Column   2   (Table   2)   shows   that   the   same   set   of   factors   are   statistically  
significant  for  the  selected  (matched)  sample  (Results  in  Table  2  are  obtained  for  all  RTAs).  
  
Table  2.  Determinants  of  RTAs  
  
Next,  Equation  (5)   is  estimated  using  OLS  with  time  dummies  and  panel  data.  The  main  results  are  
shown  in  Table  3.  Columns  (1)  and  (2)  show  the  results  for  all  RTAs  for  the  matched  sample  and  for  
the  whole  sample,  respectively.  Next,  columns  (3)  and  (4)  show  the  same  two  sets  of  results  for  RTAs  
with  EPs  and  columns  (5)  and  (6)  for  RTAs  without  EPs.  Time  effects  are  included  in  order  to  capture  
time  trends  that  may  affect  emissions  and  are  common  for  all  countries.    
                                                                                                                    
21  The  Stata  command  pscore  is  used  to  check  that  the  balancing  property  is  satisfied  (number  of  blocks  
between  5  and  8)  and  the  command  psmatch2  with  a  calliper  (0.01)  is  used  for  the  matching  (years  with  
matching  and  common  support  satisfied:  1981,  1983,  1986,  1991,  1992,  1993,  1994,  1995,  1996,  1997-­‐1998  
and  1999-­‐2008).  
22  For  each  independent  variable,  the  difference  between  target  and  control  countries  is  checked  by  employing  
a  T-­‐test  on  the  differences  within  bands  of  the  propensity  score.  
23  The  bias  could  be  defined  as  the  difference  of  the  sample  mean  in  the  treated  and  non  treated  sub-­‐samples  




Table  3.  Emissions  pollution  gap  and  economic  integration  
  
Looking  at  the  results  for  the  matched  sample,  the  coefficient  of  the  target  variable  (Effect_RTA)  is  
negative  and  statistically  significant  only  when  RTAs  with  EPs  are  considered  (column  3).  Countries  
involved  in  RTAs  with  EPs  converge  in  terms  of  CO2  emissions  after  the  agreements  have  come  into  
force.  This  negative  sign  can  be   interpreted  as  supporting  evidence  for  emission  convergence.  Our  
preferred   specification,   with   the   difference-­‐in-­‐differences   and   matching   techniques,   displays   a  
coefficient  of  about  -­‐0.20.  Hence,  the  gap  in  emissions  per  capita  between  countries  involved  in  an  
RTA  with  EP   is  around  eighteen  percent   (=exp(-­‐0.197-­‐1)*100)   lower   than   for  countries  without  an  
RTA.  We  have  to  underline   the   fact  that   the  effect  of  RTA  participation   is  positive  and  statistically  
significant   for   agreements   that  do  not   include  environmental  provisions,   indicating   that  emissions  
seem  to  diverge  due  to  RTA  participation  in  agreements  that  do  not  include  EPs  (column  5,  Table  3).    
The  results  obtained  for  the  whole  sample  (without  matching)  indicate  that  the  RTA  effect  is  smaller  
for   the  RTAs  with  EPs   (estimated  coefficient   is   statistically   significant  and  equal   to   -­‐0.037  versus   -­‐
0.20   in   the   matched   sample).   However,   for   the   RTAs   without   EP   the   effect   was   not   statistically  
significant  at  conventional  levels  supporting  no  convergence  in  pollution  levels.    
With  respect  to  the  control  variables,  our  results  for  the  matched  sample  show  that  population  and  
gross  domestic  product  per  capita  ratios  are  positively  related  to  the  emissions  gap.  These  variables  
are  used  as  control  variables  and  are  assumed  to  capture  the  scale  and  technique  effect  respectively.  
Convergence   in   the   scale   of   the   economy   as   well   as   in   technology   is   positively   correlated   to  
convergence  in  emissions  of  CO2  for  pairs  of  countries.  As  regards  the  land  ratio,  countries  that  have  
a  more  similar   land  allocation  tend  to  have  more  similar  emission   levels.  Concerning  the  openness  
ratio,  the  corresponding  estimated  coefficient  is  negative,  indicating  that  greater  differences  in  trade  
openness  tend  to  reduce  the  emissions  gap  between  trading  partners.  Conversely,  bilateral  trade  is  
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positively  related  to  the  emissions  gap,  indicating  that  countries  that  trade  relatively  more  with  each  
other  tend  to  have  higher  emission  gaps.  
  In   a   second   step,   similar   estimations   are   obtained   for   specific   agreements.   Among   them,   The  
European  Union,   NAFTA   and   the   Euro-­‐Med   agreements   (European  Union   countries   and   southern  
Mediterranean   countries:  Morocco,  Algeria,   Tunisia,  Egypt,   Jordan  and  Turkey).  On   the  one  hand,  
the  first  two  agreements  are  relevant  because  both  specifically  include  EP,  but  in  a  different  way,  as  
described   in  Section  2  above.  The   latter  agreement   is  of  special   interest  because  the  EU  has  been  
providing  funds  for  South  Mediterranean  countries  to  improve  their  environmental  standards  since  
the  1990s,  even  before  the  bilateral  interim  agreements  entered  into  force.  Estimates  of  equation  5  
with  time  effects  are  shown  in  Table  4.  We  estimate  equation  (5)  for  the  matched  sample,  namely  
the  pairs  of  countries  linked  by  one  agreement  (treated  units)  and  pairs  of  similar  countries  (selected  
control  group).  The  results  shown  in  Table  4  indicate  that  the  RTA  effect  is  negative  and  significant  
for  all  three  agreements.    
  
Table  4.  Emissions  pollution  gap  and  specific  agreements  
  
Indeed,  the  interaction  variable  that  proxies  the  membership  effects  on  the  emissions  gap  displays  a  
coefficient  of   (-­‐0.51)  for  NAFTA,   (-­‐0.14)  for  the  EU  and  (-­‐0.25)  for  the  Euro-­‐Med.   It   is  worth  noting  
that   the  NAFTA   agreement   entails   greater   emission   convergence   than   the   average   effect  of   RTAs  
with  EPs  and  the  same  is  the  case  for   the  Euro-­‐Med.   In  particular,  the  gap   in  per  capita  emissions  
between   NAFTA   countries   is   around   40   percent   ((exp(-­‐0.513)-­‐1)*100)   lower   than   for   similar  
countries  without  an  RTA.  Therefore,  the  NAFTA  agreement  fosters  convergence  of  CO2  emissions.    
  




Finally,   Table   5   presents   the   estimates   obtained   when   model   (6)   is   estimated.   The   main   results  
indicate  that  emissions  are  around  0.3  percent  lower  for  countries  that  have  RTAs  with  EPs,  whereas  
the   effect   is   not   statistically   significant   for   countries   with   RTAs   without   EPs.   Hence   emissions  




This  paper  examines  the   impact  of   regional   integration  on  CO2  emissions.  We  adopted  a  reduced-­‐
form   specification   linked   to   the  emissions   convergence  hypothesis   in  which   relative  emissions  are  
explained   using   income,   population,   land   area,   openness   in   relative   terms,   bilateral   trade   and   a  
dummy   for   RTA   agreements.   The   model   is   estimated   using   a   difference-­‐in-­‐differences   approach  
paying  special  attention  to  the  potential  selection   induced  by  RTAs  and  to  the  endogeneity  of   the  
income  and  trade  variables.  A  propensity  matching  technique  is  used  to  treat  RTAs  and  to  extract  a  
sub-­‐sample  containing  only  matched  pairs  of  countries  that  share  similar  characteristics.  
Our  results  consistently   indicate  that  RTAs  that  specifically   include  environmental  provisions  foster  
convergence   of   CO2   emissions.   In   particular,   the   gap   in   emissions   per   capita   is   about   eighteen  
percent   lower   for   pairs   of   countries   that   have   signed   RTAs   with   environmental   harmonisation  
policies  than  for  the  rest  when  the  matched  sample  is  used.    
As  regards  specific  agreements,  our  estimations  indicate  that  the  emissions  pollution  gap  is  twenty-­‐
two  percent  lower  for  pairs  of  countries  involved  in  Euro-­‐Mediterranean  Agreements  than  for  similar  
pairs   of   countries   not   involved   in   RTAs.   The   effect   is   slightly   less   pronounced   for   EU-­‐27   pairs   of  
countries,   for  which  the  emission  gap   is  around  thirteen  percent   lower  than  for  similar  non-­‐EU-­‐27  
countries   and   more   pronounced   for   NAFTA,   for   which   the   emission   gap   is   around   forty   percent  
lower  than  for  similar  non-­‐NAFTA  countries.  It  is  worth  noting  that  reductions  in  the  emissions  gap  
stemming  from  an  integration  agreement  which  explicitly  establishes  an  obligation  for  the  parties  to  
effectively  enforce  their  environmental  laws,  like  NAFTA,  are  larger  than  those  related  to  RTAs  such  
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as  the  Euro-­‐Mediterranean  or  EU  agreements,  which  contain  fewer  and  more  broadly  worded  EPs.  
The  main  economic  policy  recommendation  that  can  be  derived  from  our  results  is  that  only  regional  
integration  processes  that  include  environmental  harmonisation  policies  will  be  able  to  contribute  to  
reducing  or  at  least  controlling  emissions  levels.  
Moreover,   an   agreement   that   prescribes   monetary   compensations   for   noncompliance   with   EPs  
seems   to   go   hand   in   hand   with   stricter   environmental   regulations   that   are   common   for   all   its  
members,  as  in  the  case  of  NAFTA  integration,  and  this  appears  to  be  linked  to  greater  reductions  in  
the  abovementioned  pollution  gap  in  comparison  to  other  agreements.    
Further  research  concerning  other  pollutants  is  also  desirable  in  order  to  ascertain  whether  the  link  
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Table  1:  Summary  of  covariate  means  
   Country  pairs  with  an  RTA     Country  pairs  without  an  RTA  
Ln  of  distance   7.34   8.86  
Sum  of  the  ln  of  GDPs   18.64   17.31  
Adjacency  dummy   0.13   0.009  
Language  dummy   0.26   0.15  
  




Table  2.  Determinants  of  RTAs  
  
Model  1   Model  2  
  
All   Matched  
Sum  of  the  ln  of  GDPs   0.205***   0.127***  
  
(0.003)   (0.006)  
Ln  distance   -­‐0.955***   -­‐0.212***  
  
(0.007)   (0.011)  
Contiguity   0.062**   0.297***  
  
(0.026)   (0.038)  
Common  language   0.102***   0.110***  
  
(0.015)   (0.024)  
Pseudo  R2   0.395   0.032  
Observations   201,558   25,629  
Note:  Standard  errors  in  brackets.  ***  p<0.01,  **  p<0.05,  *  p<0.1  
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Table  3.  Emissions  pollution  gap  and  economic  integration  for  RTAs  with  and  without  
environmental  provisions  (EP)  
   All  RTAs   With  EP   Without  EP  
VARIABLES   Matched   All  (panel)   Matched   All  (panel)   Matched   All  (panel)  
Effect_RTA   -­‐0.008   -­‐0.013   -­‐0.197***   -­‐0.037*   0.160***   0.026  
     (0.04)   (0.01)   (0.07)   (0.02)   (0.05)   (0.02)  
Abs  Ln  population  ratio   0.799***   0.706***   0.892***   0.677***   0.816***   0.694***  
     (0.01)   (0.04)   (0.01)   (0.04)   (0.01)   (0.04)  
Abs  Ln  land  per  capita  ratio   0.089***   0.025   -­‐0.020   0.013   0.100***   0.001  
     (0.01)   (0.04)   (0.01)   (0.04)   (0.01)   (0.04)  
Abs  Ln  GDP  per  capita     0.079***   0.029   0.287***   0.034   0.045***   0.024  
predicted  ratio   (0.01)   (0.02)   (0.02)   (0.02)   (0.01)   (0.02)  
Abs  ln  openness     -­‐0.035*   0.003   0.042   0.002   -­‐0.086***   0.011  
predicted  ratio   (0.02)   (0.03)   (0.04)   (0.03)   (0.02)   (0.03)  
Abs  Ln  bilateral  trade     0.183***   0.574***   0.099***   0.603***   0.170***   0.618***  
predicted  (ij)   (0.00)   (0.02)   (0.01)   (0.03)   (0.01)   (0.03)  
Time  Fixed  Effects   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes  
R-­‐squared   0.571   0.230   0.697   0.221   0.545   0.235  
N   14243   68847   4986   58968   10513   63312  
Log-­‐likelihood   -­‐20562.58   5810.605   -­‐6204.702   4018.496   -­‐15918.54   4406.19  
Root  Mean  Square  Error   1.026   0.222   0.843   0.226   1.102   0.226  
Note:  Robust  standard  errors  in  brackets.  ***  p<0.01,  **  p<0.05,  *  p<0.1.  
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Table  4.  Emissions  pollution  gap  and  specific  agreements  
  
VARIABLES   Matched  
Effect_EU   -­‐0.141***  
     (0.03)  
Effect_Euro-­‐Med   -­‐0.251***  
     (0.03)  
Effect_NAFTA   -­‐0.513**  
     (0.22)  
Abs  Ln  population  ratio   0.798***  
   (0.01)  
Abs  Ln  land  per  capita  ratio   0.088***  
   (0.01)  
Abs  Ln  GDP  per  capita  predicted  ratio   0.0783***  
   (0.01)  
Abs  ln  openness  predicted  ratio   -­‐0.045**  
   (0.02)  
Abs  Ln  bilateral  trade  predicted  (ij)   0.187***  
   (0.00)  
Constant   -­‐2.390***  
     (0.11)  
Time  Fixed  Effects   Yes  
R-­‐squared   0.573  
Observations   14243  
Log-­‐likelihood   -­‐20539  
Root  Mean  Square  Error   1.025  
Note:  Robust  standard  errors  in  brackets.  ***  p<0.01,  **  p<0.05,  *  p<0.1.  
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Table  5.  Emissions  and  economic  integration  for  RTAs  with  and  without  environmental  provisions  
(EP)  
Effect  on  Total  Emissions     All  RTAs   RTAs  with  EP   RTAs  without  EP    
RTA
  
     -­‐.000317*      -­‐.00306**     -­‐.000747        
       (0.000)         (0.001)         (0.001)        
Ln  population     .818         .8  00       .835        
       (1.213)         (1.237)         (1.225)        
Ln  land  per  capita     -­‐.799         -­‐.754         -­‐.785        
   (1.191)         (1.217)         (1.204)        
Ln  GDP  per  capita  predicted   .830***   .833***   .829***  
   (0.107)         (0.105)         (0.107)        
Ln  Openness  predicted   -­‐.0754         -­‐.0812         -­‐.0696        
   (0.102)         (0.102)         (0.104)        
N   2227   2227   2227  
R-­‐squared   0.707         0.712         0.707        








Figure  1.  Kernel  density  of  the  log  of  bilateral  distance  for  pair-­‐wise  countries  without  and  with  an  RTA  
    
  







Table  A.1.  List  of  RTA  types  and  dates  they  came  into  force  
RTA  Name   Type   Date  of  entry  into  force  
Andean  Community  (CAN)   CU   25-­‐May-­‐88  
Armenia  -­‐  Kazakhstan   FTA   25-­‐Dec-­‐01  
Armenia  -­‐  Moldova   FTA   21-­‐Dec-­‐95  
Armenia  -­‐  Russian  Federation   FTA   25-­‐Mar-­‐93  
Armenia  -­‐  Turkmenistan   FTA   07-­‐Jul-­‐96  
Armenia  -­‐  Ukraine   FTA   18-­‐Dec-­‐96  
ASEAN  -­‐  China   PSA  &  EIA   01-­‐Jan-­‐2005(G)  /  01-­‐Jul-­‐2007(S)  
ASEAN  Free  Trade  Area  (AFTA)   FTA   28-­‐Jan-­‐92  
Asia  Pacific  Trade  Agreement  (APTA)   PSA   17-­‐Jun-­‐76  
Asia  Pacific  Trade  Agreement  (APTA)  -­‐  Accession  of  China   PSA   01-­‐Jan-­‐02  
Australia  -­‐  New  Zealand  (ANZCERTA)   FTA  &  EIA   01-­‐Jan-­‐1983(G)  /  01-­‐Jan-­‐1989(S)  
Australia  -­‐  Papua  New  Guinea  (PATCRA)   FTA   01-­‐Feb-­‐77  
Canada  -­‐  Chile*   FTA  &  EIA   05-­‐Jul-­‐97  
Canada  -­‐  Costa  Rica*   FTA   01-­‐Nov-­‐02  
Canada  -­‐  Israel   FTA   01-­‐Jan-­‐97  
Caribbean  Community  and  Common  Market  (CARICOM)   CU  &  EIA   01-­‐Aug-­‐1973(G)  /  04-­‐Jul-­‐2002(S)  
Central  American  Common  Market  (CACM)   CU   04-­‐Jun-­‐61  
Central  European  Free  Trade  Agreement  (CEFTA)  2006   FTA   01-­‐May-­‐07  
Chile  -­‐  China*   FTA  &  EIA   01-­‐Oct-­‐2006(G)  /  01-­‐Aug-­‐2010(S)  
Chile  -­‐  Costa  Rica  (Chile  -­‐  Central  America)   FTA  &  EIA   15-­‐Feb-­‐02  
Chile  -­‐  El  Salvador  (Chile  -­‐  Central  America)   FTA  &  EIA   01-­‐Jun-­‐02  
Chile  -­‐  Japan*   FTA  &  EIA   03-­‐Sep-­‐07  
Chile  -­‐  Mexico*   FTA  &  EIA   01-­‐Aug-­‐99  
China  -­‐  Hong  Kong,  China   FTA  &  EIA   29-­‐Jun-­‐03  
China  -­‐  Macao,  China   FTA  &  EIA   17-­‐Oct-­‐03  
Common  Economic  Zone  (CEZ)   FTA   20-­‐May-­‐04  
Common  Market  for  Eastern  and  Southern  Africa  (COMESA)*   CU   08-­‐Dec-­‐94  
Commonwealth  of  Independent  States  (CIS)   FTA   30-­‐Dec-­‐94  
Costa  Rica  -­‐  Mexico*   FTA  &  EIA   01-­‐Jan-­‐95  
Dominican  Republic  -­‐  Central  America  -­‐  United  States  Free  Trade  
Agreement  (CAFTA-­‐DR)  
FTA  &  EIA   01-­‐Mar-­‐06  
East  African  Community  (EAC)   CU   07-­‐Jul-­‐00  
EC  (10)  Enlargement   CU   01-­‐Jan-­‐81  
EC  (12)  Enlargement   CU   01-­‐Jan-­‐86  
EC  (15)  Enlargement   CU  &  EIA   01-­‐Jan-­‐95  
EC  (25)  Enlargement   CU  &  EIA   01-­‐May-­‐04  
EC  (27)  Enlargement   CU  &  EIA   01-­‐Jan-­‐07  
EC  (9)  Enlargement   CU   01-­‐Jan-­‐73  
EC  Treaty   CU  &  EIA   01-­‐Jan-­‐58  
Economic  and  Monetary  Community  of  Central  Africa  (CEMAC)*   CU   24-­‐Jun-­‐99  
Economic  Community  of  West  African  States  (ECOWAS)   CU   24-­‐Jul-­‐93  
Economic  Cooperation  Organization  (ECO)   PSA   17-­‐Feb-­‐92  
EFTA  -­‐  Chile   FTA  &  EIA   01-­‐Dec-­‐04  
EFTA  -­‐  Croatia   FTA   01-­‐Jan-­‐02  
EFTA  -­‐  Egypt   FTA   01-­‐Aug-­‐07  
EFTA  -­‐  Former  Yugoslav  Republic  of  Macedonia   FTA   01-­‐May-­‐02  
EFTA  -­‐  Israel   FTA   01-­‐Jan-­‐93  
EFTA  -­‐  Jordan   FTA   01-­‐Sep-­‐02  
EFTA  -­‐  Korea,  Republic  of   FTA  &  EIA   01-­‐Sep-­‐06  
EFTA  -­‐  Lebanon   FTA   01-­‐Jan-­‐07  
EFTA  -­‐  Mexico   FTA  &  EIA   01-­‐Jul-­‐01  
EFTA  -­‐  Morocco   FTA   01-­‐Dec-­‐99  
EFTA  -­‐  Palestinian  Authority   FTA   01-­‐Jul-­‐99  
EFTA  -­‐  SACU   FTA   01-­‐May-­‐08  
EFTA  -­‐  Singapore   FTA  &  EIA   01-­‐Jan-­‐03  
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EFTA  -­‐  Tunisia   FTA   01-­‐Jun-­‐05  
EFTA  -­‐  Turkey   FTA   01-­‐Apr-­‐92  
EFTA  accession  of  Iceland   FTA   01-­‐Mar-­‐70  
Egypt  -­‐  Turkey   FTA   01-­‐Mar-­‐07  
EU  -­‐  Albania   FTA  &  EIA   01-­‐Dec-­‐2006(G)  /  01-­‐Apr-­‐2009(S)  
EU  -­‐  Algeria   FTA   01-­‐Sep-­‐05  
EU  -­‐  Andorra   CU   01-­‐Jul-­‐91  
EU  -­‐  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina   FTA   01-­‐Jul-­‐08  
EU  -­‐  Chile   FTA  &  EIA   01-­‐Feb-­‐2003(G)  /  01-­‐Mar-­‐2005(S)  
EU  -­‐  Croatia   FTA  &  EIA   01-­‐Mar-­‐2002(G)  /  01-­‐Feb-­‐2005(S)  
EU  -­‐  Egypt   FTA   01-­‐Jun-­‐04  
EU  -­‐  Faroe  Islands   FTA   01-­‐Jan-­‐97  
EU  -­‐  Former  Yugoslav  Republic  of  Macedonia   FTA  &  EIA   01-­‐Jun-­‐2001(G)  /  01-­‐Apr-­‐2004(S)  
EU  -­‐  Iceland   FTA   01-­‐Apr-­‐73  
EU  -­‐  Israel   FTA   01-­‐Jun-­‐00  
EU  -­‐  Jordan*   FTA   01-­‐May-­‐02  
EU  -­‐  Lebanon   FTA   01-­‐Mar-­‐03  
EU  -­‐  Mexico   FTA  &  EIA   01-­‐Jul-­‐2000(G)  /  01-­‐Oct-­‐2000(S)  
EU  -­‐  Montenegro   FTA  &  EIA   01-­‐Jan-­‐2008(G)  /  01-­‐May-­‐2010(S)  
EU  -­‐  Morocco   FTA   01-­‐Mar-­‐00  
EU  -­‐  Norway   FTA   01-­‐Jul-­‐73  
EU  ʹ  Overseas  Countries  and  Territories  (OCT)   FTA   01-­‐Jan-­‐71  
EU  -­‐  Palestinian  Authority   FTA   01-­‐Jul-­‐97  
EU  -­‐  South  Africa   FTA   01-­‐Jan-­‐00  
EU  -­‐  Switzerland  -­‐  Liechtenstein   FTA   01-­‐Jan-­‐73  
EU  -­‐  Syria   FTA   01-­‐Jul-­‐77  
EU  -­‐  Tunisia*   FTA   01-­‐Mar-­‐98  
EU  -­‐  Turkey   CU   01-­‐Jan-­‐96  
Eurasian  Economic  Community  (EAEC)   CU   08-­‐Oct-­‐97  
European  Economic  Area  (EEA)   EIA   01-­‐Jan-­‐94  
European  Free  Trade  Association  (EFTA)   FTA  &  EIA   03-­‐May-­‐1960(G)  /  01-­‐Jun-­‐2002(S)  
Faroe  Islands  -­‐  Norway   FTA   01-­‐Jul-­‐93  
Faroe  Islands  -­‐  Switzerland   FTA   01-­‐Mar-­‐95  
Georgia  -­‐  Armenia   FTA   11-­‐Nov-­‐98  
Georgia  -­‐  Azerbaijan   FTA   10-­‐Jul-­‐96  
Georgia  -­‐  Kazakhstan   FTA   16-­‐Jul-­‐99  
Georgia  -­‐  Russian  Federation   FTA   10-­‐May-­‐94  
Georgia  -­‐  Turkmenistan   FTA   01-­‐Jan-­‐00  
Georgia  -­‐  Ukraine   FTA   04-­‐Jun-­‐96  
Global  System  of  Trade  Preferences  among  Developing  Countries  (GSTP)   PSA   19-­‐Apr-­‐89  
Gulf  Cooperation  Council  (GCC)   CU   01-­‐Jan-­‐03  
Iceland  -­‐  Faroe  Islands   FTA  &  EIA   01-­‐Nov-­‐06  
India  ʹ  Bhutan   FTA   29-­‐Jul-­‐06  
India  ʹ  Singapore   FTA  &  EIA   01-­‐Aug-­‐05  
India  -­‐  Sri  Lanka   FTA   15-­‐Dec-­‐01  
Israel  ʹ  Mexico   FTA   01-­‐Jul-­‐00  
Japan  -­‐  Malaysia*   FTA  &  EIA   13-­‐Jul-­‐06  
Japan  -­‐  Mexico*   FTA  &  EIA   01-­‐Apr-­‐05  
Japan  ʹ  Singapore   FTA  &  EIA   30-­‐Nov-­‐02  
Jordan  ʹ  Singapore   FTA  &  EIA   22-­‐Aug-­‐05  
Korea,  Republic  of  ʹ  Chile   FTA  &  EIA   01-­‐Apr-­‐04  
Korea,  Republic  of  -­‐  Singapore*   FTA  &  EIA   02-­‐Mar-­‐06  
Kyrgyz  Republic  ʹ  Armenia   FTA   27-­‐Oct-­‐95  
Kyrgyz  Republic  ʹ  Kazakhstan   FTA   11-­‐Nov-­‐95  
Kyrgyz  Republic  ʹ  Moldova   FTA   21-­‐Nov-­‐96  
Kyrgyz  Republic  -­‐  Russian  Federation   FTA   24-­‐Apr-­‐93  
Kyrgyz  Republic  ʹ  Ukraine   FTA   19-­‐Jan-­‐98  
Kyrgyz  Republic  ʹ  Uzbekistan   FTA   20-­‐Mar-­‐98  
Lao  People's  Democratic  Republic  -­‐  Thailand   PSA   20-­‐Jun-­‐91  
Latin  American  Integration  Association  (LAIA)   PSA   18-­‐Mar-­‐81  
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Melanesian  Spearhead  Group  (MSG)   PSA   01-­‐Jan-­‐94  
Mexico  -­‐  El  Salvador  (Mexico  -­‐  Northern  Triangle)   FTA  &  EIA   15-­‐Mar-­‐01  
Mexico  -­‐  Guatemala  (Mexico  -­‐  Northern  Triangle)   FTA  &  EIA   15-­‐Mar-­‐01  
Mexico  -­‐  Honduras  (Mexico  -­‐  Northern  Triangle)   FTA  &  EIA   01-­‐Jun-­‐01  
Mexico  ʹ  Nicaragua   FTA  &  EIA   01-­‐Jul-­‐98  
New  Zealand  ʹ  Singapore   FTA  &  EIA   01-­‐Jan-­‐01  
North  American  Free  Trade  Agreement  (NAFTA)*   FTA  &  EIA   01-­‐Jan-­‐94  
Pacific  Island  Countries  Trade  Agreement  (PICTA)   FTA   13-­‐Apr-­‐03  
Pakistan  ʹ  China   FTA  &  EIA   01-­‐Jul-­‐2007(G)  /  10-­‐Oct-­‐2009(S)  
Pakistan  ʹ  Malaysia   FTA  &  EIA   01-­‐Jan-­‐08  
Pakistan  -­‐  Sri  Lanka   FTA   12-­‐Jun-­‐05  
Panama  -­‐  Chile*   FTA  &  EIA   07-­‐Mar-­‐08  
Panama  -­‐  Costa  Rica  (Panama  -­‐  Central  America)   FTA  &  EIA   23-­‐Nov-­‐08  
Panama  -­‐  El  Salvador  (Panama  -­‐  Central  America)   FTA  &  EIA   11-­‐Apr-­‐03  
Panama  ʹ  Singapore   FTA  &  EIA   24-­‐Jul-­‐06  
Pan-­‐Arab  Free  Trade  Area  (PAFTA)   FTA   01-­‐Jan-­‐98  
Protocol  on  Trade  Negotiations  (PTN)   PSA   11-­‐Feb-­‐73  
Singapore  ʹ  Australia   FTA  &  EIA   28-­‐Jul-­‐03  
South  Asian  Free  Trade  Agreement  (SAFTA)   FTA   01-­‐Jan-­‐06  
South  Asian  Preferential  Trade  Arrangement  (SAPTA)   PSA   07-­‐Dec-­‐95  
South  Pacific  Regional  Trade  and  Economic  Cooperation  Agreement  
(SPARTECA)  
PSA   01-­‐Jan-­‐81  
Southern  African  Customs  Union  (SACU)   CU   15-­‐Jul-­‐04  
Southern  African  Development  Community  (SADC)   FTA   01-­‐Sep-­‐00  
Southern  Common  Market  (MERCOSUR)   CU  &  EIA   29-­‐Nov-­‐1991(G)  /  07-­‐Dec-­‐2005(S)  
Thailand  ʹ  Australia   FTA  &  EIA   01-­‐Jan-­‐05  
Thailand  -­‐  New  Zealand   FTA  &  EIA   01-­‐Jul-­‐05  
Trans-­‐Pacific  Strategic  Economic  Partnership*   FTA  &  EIA   28-­‐May-­‐06  
Turkey  ʹ  Albania   FTA   01-­‐May-­‐08  
Turkey  -­‐  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina   FTA   01-­‐Jul-­‐03  
Turkey  ʹ  Croatia   FTA   01-­‐Jul-­‐03  
Turkey  -­‐  Former  Yugoslav  Republic  of  Macedonia   FTA   01-­‐Sep-­‐00  
Turkey  ʹ  Israel   FTA   01-­‐May-­‐97  
Turkey  ʹ  Morocco   FTA   01-­‐Jan-­‐06  
Turkey  -­‐  Palestinian  Authority   FTA   01-­‐Jun-­‐05  
Turkey  ʹ  Syria   FTA   01-­‐Jan-­‐07  
Turkey  ʹ  Tunisia   FTA   01-­‐Jul-­‐05  
Ukraine  ʹ  Azerbaijan   FTA   02-­‐Sep-­‐96  
Ukraine  ʹ  Belarus   FTA   11-­‐Nov-­‐06  
Ukraine  -­‐  Former  Yugoslav  Republic  of  Macedonia   FTA   05-­‐Jul-­‐01  
Ukraine  -­‐  Kazakhstan   FTA   19-­‐Oct-­‐98  
Ukraine  -­‐  Moldova   FTA   19-­‐May-­‐05  
Ukraine  -­‐  Russian  Federation   FTA   21-­‐Feb-­‐94  
Ukraine  -­‐  Tajikistan   FTA   11-­‐Jul-­‐02  
Ukraine  -­‐  Uzbekistan   FTA   01-­‐Jan-­‐96  
Ukraine  -­‐Turkmenistan   FTA   04-­‐Nov-­‐95  
US  -­‐  Australia*   FTA  &  EIA   01-­‐Jan-­‐05  
US  -­‐  Bahrain   FTA  &  EIA   01-­‐Aug-­‐06  
US  -­‐  Chile*   FTA  &  EIA   01-­‐Jan-­‐04  
US  -­‐  Israel   FTA   19-­‐Aug-­‐85  
US  -­‐  Jordan*   FTA  &  EIA   17-­‐Dec-­‐01  
US  -­‐  Morocco*   FTA  &  EIA   01-­‐Jan-­‐06  
US  -­‐  Singapore*   FTA  &  EIA   01-­‐Jan-­‐04  
West  African  Economic  and  Monetary  Union  (WAEMU)   CU   01-­‐Jan-­‐00  
Source:  World  Trade  Organization.    http://www.wto.org.    Trade  agreements  tables  include  only  agreements  in  our  sample.  
PSA  denotes  Partial  Scope  Agreement,  FTA  denotes  Free  Trade  Agreement,  CU  denote  Customs  Union  and  EIA  denotes  
Economic  Integration  Agreement.  *RTAs  with  environmental  provisions.  
  




Table  A.2.  List  of  countries    
All  countries  
Albania                     Czech  Republic   Japan   Paraguay   United  Kingdom  
Algeria   Denmark   Jordan   Peru   United  States  
Angola   Djibouti   Kazakhstan   Philippines   Uruguay  
Antigua  and  Barbuda   Dominica   Kenya   Poland   Venezuela,  RB  
Argentina   Dominican  Republic   Kiribati   Portugal   Vietnam  
Armenia   Ecuador   Korea,  Rep.   Qatar   Yemen,  Rep.    
Australia   Egypt,  Arab  Rep.   Kuwait   Russian  Federation     
Austria   El  Salvador   Kyrgyz  Republic   Rwanda     
Azerbaijan   Eritrea   Latvia   Saudi  Arabia     
Bahrain   Estonia   Lebanon   Senegal     
Bangladesh   Ethiopia   Lithuania   Seychelles     
Belarus   Fiji   Luxembourg   Sierra  Leone     
Belgium   Finland   Macedonia,  FYR   Slovak  Republic     
Belize   France   Madagascar   Slovenia     
Benin   Gabon   Malawi   South  Africa     
Bhutan   Gambia,  The   Malaysia   Spain     
Bolivia   Georgia   Maldives   Sri  Lanka     
Botswana   Germany   Mali   St.  Kitts  and  Nevis     
Brazil   Ghana   Malta   St.  Lucia     
Brunei  Darussalam   Greece   Mauritania   St.  Vincent  and  the  Grenadines     
Bulgaria   Grenada   Mauritius   Sudan     
Burkina  Faso   Guatemala   Mexico   Suriname     
Burundi   Guinea   Moldova   Swaziland     
Cambodia   Guinea-­‐Bissau   Mongolia   Sweden     
Cameroon   Guyana   Morocco   Switzerland     
Canada   Haiti   Mozambique   Syrian  Arab  Republic     
Cape  Verde   Honduras   Namibia   Tajikistan     
Central  African  
Republic  
Hong  Kong  SAR,  China   Nepal   Tanzania     
Chile   Hungary   Netherlands   Thailand     
China   Iceland   New  Zealand   Togo     
Colombia   India   Nicaragua   Tonga     
Comoros   Indonesia   Niger   Trinidad  and  Tobago     
Congo,  Rep.   Iran,  Islamic  Rep.   Norway   Tunisia     
Costa  Rica   Ireland   Oman   Turkey     
Cote  d'Ivoire   Israel   Pakistan   Uganda     
Croatia   Italy   Panama   Ukraine     
Cyprus   Jamaica   Papua  New  Guinea   United  Arab  Emirates       
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Algeria   Austria  
Egypt   Belgium  
Israel   Bulgaria  
Jordan   Cyprus  
Lebanon   Czech  
Republic  
Morocco   Denmark  
Tunisia   Estonia  
Turkey   Finland  
   France  
   Germany  
   Greece  
   Hungary  
   Ireland  
   Italy  
   Latvia  
   Lithuania  
   Luxembourg  
   Malta  
   Netherlands  
   Poland  
   Portugal  
   Romania*  
   Slovak  
Republic  
   Slovenia  
   Spain  
   Sweden  
   UK  











Table  A.3.  Descriptive  Statistics    
Variable   Obs.   Mean   Std.  Dev.   Min.   Max.  
                 lCO2_ratio   61945   2.616   1.919   0   12.306  
rta_ever   61945   0.226   0.418   0   1  
after_rta   61945   0.940   0.237   0   1  
effect_rta   61945   0.184   0.388   0   1  
Abs  Ln  population  ratio   61945   1.987   1.559   2.93E-­‐06   10.257  
Abs  Ln  land  per  capita  ratio   61945   1.554   1.232   0.00004   8.342  
Abs  Ln  GDP  per  capita  predicted  
ratio  
61945   1.835   1.320   0.00004   5.951  
Abs  Ln  Openness  predicted  ratio   61945   0.837   0.608   7.22E-­‐06   3.676  
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Table  A.4.  Matching  Statistics    
      Mean        
Variable     Sample   Treated   Control   Bias  
(%)  
Reduction  
in  bias  (%)  
Ln  distance   Unmatched   7.73373   8.8641   -­‐197.6   57.3  
   Matched   7.73373   7.9891   -­‐84.4  
Ln  (ܩܦ ௜ܲ כ ܩܦ ௝ܲ)   Unmatched   18.648   17.311   70.4   69.4  
   Matched   18.648   18.24   21.5  
Common  
Language  
Unmatched   0.26049   0.15088   27.4   13.6  
Matched   0.26049   0.16576   23.7  
Contiguity   Unmatched   0.13524   0.00905   50.3   28.0  
   Matched   0.13524   0.04435   36.2  
  
  
